The Perils of Political Centralization
An Account of a Conversation Concerning a Right Regulation of Governments for the Common Good of Mankind in a Letter to the Marquess of Montrose, the Earls of Rothes, Roxburgh, and Haddingtoun, from London the 1st of December 1703.
Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun (1653-1716)
Whole countries which are most remote from the seat of the Government ought not to expect an equal participation of liberty and immunities with those that lie at less distance. For if they should enjoy the same privileges, the subjection of such nations could not be secured. You know that under the Roman government the liberties and privileges of those who lived in and about the City of Rome were far greater than the rest of Italy enjoyed, which yet was possessed of many more than any of the provinces.
I doubt not, said Fletcher, this order was very proper to retain the Dominion of the world in the power of one city. But I think those nations might have lived more happily under another kind of regulation, and am fully persuaded that all great governments, whether Republic or monarchies, not only disturb the world in their rise and fall; but by bringing together such numbers of men and immense riches into one city, inevitably corrupt all good manners, and make them uncapable of order and discipline, as you have already owned, and experience has but too well demonstrated. Rome, the greatest of all, incessantly disturbed her neighbors for seven hundred years; and after the conquest of almost all the known world, was corrupted by excess of riches and power, and spread the infection over all the parts of that Empire, which at length brought in so many barbarous nations, and caused so many wars and so great effusion of blood, that the world suffered as much by the overthrow and destruction as by the rise and continuance of that might power.
Yet, said he, I think ’tis necessary that a considerable body of people should be united under one government, and by that means enabled to defend themselves against a powerful enemy, because by the successful ambition of some men, we frequently see great and formidable powers arise in the world, to the disturbance of all their neighbors.
In that, I perfectly agree with you, said I.
Pray then, replied he, what numbers would you allow in such a body of men; or rather, what extent of territory would you think necessary to a right division of the world, into several distinct governments; since you are so much an enemy to all great and overgrown powers?
You seem willing, said I, to confer such an office upon me, that those who do not know my name, will take me for a second Phaleg.
Not to lay then too great a burden upon you at once, answered he, I desire you to acquaint us into what parts you would divide Europe, most commodiously to obtain the true ends of government.
I replied, that God and Nature seemed to have marked out certain portions of the world for several great societies of men, having divided them from each other by seas and mountains, or some remarkable difference of the soil and climate. The island of Britain and that of Ireland seem conveniently situated for one government; Spain and Portugal for another, because they lie together in one compact body, and are divided from the rest of Europe by the Pyrenaean Mountains. In like manner, France is contained within the Alps, Jura, the Vege, the Ardennel and the Pyrenees. Italy is separated from all other parts by the Alps and the three adjacent islands seem naturally to belong to that country. The seventeen provinces, the circles of Westphalia and lower Saxony, with the arch-bishopric of Cologne and the Kingdom of Denmark, seem commodiously placed to be united under one government. The rest of Germany, with the Swiss Cantons, and the Provinces that lie between those countries and the Adriatic Sea, might very well compose another. Norway, Sweden, Finland and the northern parts of the European Moscovy, lying under the same climate, may be conveniently joined together. Poland, Prussia, Lithuania, and the southern parts of the European Moscovy, with the little Tartary, might likewise be properly united. The countries that lie to the north of Macedonia and Albania, and on the south of the Carpathian mountains, from Austria, Stiria and Carnoiola to the Black Sea, might be a ninth distinct government, and Macedonia, Albania, Thessaly, Epirus, Achaia, Morea, Negropont, Candia and the adjacent islands, a tenth. And now I think I may rest, and take breath after so long a journey, leaving to any other the liberty of making the like through the other three parts of the world.
What all this tends to I cannot imagine, said Sir Christopher, for by your division, our own government would continue to be of as great extent as now.
You shall know that, said I, before we part. In the meantime, to justify in some measure the reasonableness of this division, you may consider, that almost every one of the ten parts, into which I have divided Europe, speaks a language distinct from all the rest, and that the people are generally of the same temper and like dispositions. You have led me into such a maze, said the Earl, and raised so many new thoughts in me, that without regard to our former reasoning, I must pursue some of them. That which occurs to me first, is, that if governments so equal in strength either on account of their riches or situation, should come to be established, mankind might live in greater peace than they do; especially if these governments were by mutual alliances obliged to preserve the common tranquility.
But you are to observe, said Sir Christopher, the imperfection of this project to preserve peace in the world. For though one or two of these governments might not dare to disturb and injure the rest, yet nothing can hinder one half of them from combining against the other. And as such wars would be managed by a far greater number of forces than the present, mankind must of consequence be made more miserable.
The nature of human affairs is such, said I, that a perpetual peace is not to be preserved among men; yet certainly some constitutions of government are better fitted to maintain the public tranquility than others. And in place of the continual great and ruinous wars, which questions about the succession of princes, and their ambitious designs, have entailed upon the world, things might be brought to less frequent contentions, and the public animosities either prevented from proceeding to open breaches; or, if at sometimes wars could no way be avoided, they might be neither lasting nor bloody.
If you can show, said he, how so happy a state of things may be introduced, into the world, you will do the greatest service imaginable to mankind. For matters are now brought to such a pass, that in every war, almost all Europe and America, with a great part of Asia and Africa become engaged.
You are in the right, said I; and these universal wars, as I may call them, which with little interruption have continued more than thirty years, have so distressed this part of the world, and occasioned such disorder in the affairs of men, that Europe is thought to be diminished a full fifth in value. For wars, besides that they are become universal, are now wholly managed by the force and power of money, and by that means most grievously oppress and afflict not only the places that are the theaters of action, but even the remotest village and most solitary cottages. I think mankind might be best preserved from such convulsions and misery, and instead of framing governments with regard only to a single society, as I believe all legislators have hitherto done, we should constitute such as would be no less advantageous to our neighbors than ourselves.
You talk strangely, said Sir Christopher, as if our advantage were not frequently inconsistent with that of our neighbors.
I am of opinion, replied I, that the true interest and good of any nation is the same with that of any other. I do not say, that one society ought not to repel the injuries of another; but that no people ever did any injustice to a neighboring nation, except by mistaking their own interest.
You talk, said he, of injustice, but I speak of advantage.
If you go about, said I, to take away by force any advantage that belongs to a neighboring people, you not only to injustice to them, but injure yourself by the example.
Whatever the example be, replied he, the advantage will accrue to my country.
But a citizen in the service of his country, said he, is not obliged to the same scruples as in his private affairs; and must be true to his public trust, and take care that the commonwealth suffer no prejudice.
Then, said I, no man can be a good citizen of a particular commonwealth, and a citizen of the world; no man can be a true friend to his country and to mankind at the same time.
I confess, said he, this conclusion naturally follows; but we may not dispense with the interest of our country as with our own; and you know the precepts contained in the Sermon on the Mount relate to the actions of private men.
Do you think then, said I, that one nation cannot do injustice to another?
Yes, answered he, when that which is done is to the prejudice of both. And do you not also think, said I, that one nation may make an unjust war against another?
Yes.
Then if your country should make such a war with success, they would have accomplished an unjust design.
True, said he; but if thereby an advantage accrue to the Nation, this becomes an acquired right to the people, and ought to be defended by all those who are entrusted with the public affairs.
Now, if afterwards it should happen, said I, that such a neighboring nation should renew the war, in order to recover what they had lost, would that war be unjust on their part?
I think not.
Then you lay a foundation as well for your neighbors to make a just war against you, as for your own nation to make an advantageous war (which you say is not unjust) against them. This sure is far from the design of abolishing wars so far as may be possible.
By what other means then, said he, may we hope to obtain this good end?
The most effectual way, replied I, is that all such government as are of a sufficient force to defend themselves, should be rendered either incapable or unfit to make conquests. For the ambitious desires of men to increase their dominions, have always been the principal cause of disturbing the peace of the world.
‘Tis impossible, said Sir Edward Seymour, to take away that natural and generous inclination which is found in the best of men, to extend the empire of their country; especially among us, who have such great examples in our history to encourage us, and so noble and populous a city; which by being situated near the south east point of the island, lies as conveniently to command the north of France and all the low countries, as the three kingdoms.
But, Sir, said I, do you approve what Sir Christopher has said, that wars are to be abolished by all possible means?
Suppose I do, said he; yet how can so strong an inclination, found not only in particular men, but sometimes in the whole body of a people, be altered?
If the dominions of a state, said I, might not be increased by conquest.
How is that possible?
If, for example, every one of those ten portions of Europe, as I mentioned before, had ten or twelve sovereign cities well fortified within its territories, each of them possessing and governing the adjacent districts. Such a government strengthened with forts in passes and other convenient places, might be very capable to defend itself, and yet altogether unfit for conquest. Why so?
Because, said I, a conquest divided into twelve parts would be of little account, since they could not be made adjacent to the several cities to which they ought to belong.
But, said he, such conquered places might be governed in common to the advantage of the whole union.
That, replied I, would be like a possession in common, for which no man has any particular affection, and on that account lies always neglected.
But you talk, said Sir Edward, of sovereign cities; I fancy you mean republics, which is nothing to us, who live under the benign influence of monarchy.
You may suppose those cities, said I, to be capitals of sovereign and independent kingdoms or countries. For of such sovereignties united under one monarch we have many examples. And the prince may either keep his court in each of them successively; or, which is better, reside in the country, and permit no more buildings about his palaces than are absolutely necessary for his domestics, and the dispatch of public business, and not to harbor a crew of lazy, profligate and vicious wretches, fit only to render his court a mere sink of corruption and a seminary to propagate all manner of Vice through the whole nation. So that we may proceed to reason concerning the excellency of those governments, which consist of divers sovereignties united for their common defense, whether. cities or kingdoms; whether independent already, or to be made so in order to put such a design in execution; whether governed by a prince, or by a great council of delegates.
But certainly, said he, if these distinct sovereignties were incorporated under one head and city, such a government would be of greater force.
If you mean, said I, to disturb their own peace, and that of their neighbors, I grant your assertion.
How so?
You must acknowledge, said I, that a great City is more tumultuous and disorderly, and therefore more capable of disturbing its own peace than small ones, and much more violently inclined to conquer other countries, because better able to retain the conquest.
But, said he, if diverse small sovereignties were united under one price, his authority would better preserve peace among them, than if they were governed by a council of delegates, which in my opinion is only proper to set them together by the ears.
I am very glad, said I, that you think such united governments more suitable to monarchies than to commonwealths, for if that be true, there will be greater hopes of introducing them into the world. And indeed a prince seems much more fitted to be at the head of such a league than a council, as to the military part, in which principally such a union has occasion to exerts its power. So that I have nothing more to do, than to prove that such governments are of all other the best to preserve mankind, as well from great and destructive wars as from corruption of manners, and most proper to give to every part of the world than just share in the government of themselves which is due to them.
If you can prove, said Sir Christopher, what you undertake, I shall have no more to say.
‘Tis indeed, said I, a most surprising thing to me, that not only all those who have ever actually formed governments, but even those who have written on that subject, and contrived schemes of constitutions, have, as I think, always framed them with respect only to particular nations, for whom they were designed, and without any regard to the rest of mankind. Since, as they could not but know that every society, as well as every private man, has a natural inclination to exceed in everything, and draw all advantages to itself, they might also have seen the necessity of curbing that exorbitant inclination, and obliging them to consider the general good and interest of mankind, on which that of every distinct society does in a great measure depend. And one would think that politicians, who ought to be the best of all moral philosophers, should have considered what a citizen of the world is. Most governments have been framed for conquest; that is, to disturb the peace of mankind, though I know that some were less fitted for conquest than others, as the aristocratical. But there was nothing even in those constitutions that could sufficiently restrain the desire of enlarging their dominions, though no way formed to that end; which has frequently brought great calamities upon many of those governments, as the examples of Venice and Sparta demonstrate. In the last of which the wise legislator having formed the manners of the people for war, and the constitution altogether unfit to retain conquests, I would willingly persuade myself, that he designed these two things should balance each other, in order to keep that people always exercised to arms, and yet not give them the occasion of rising to such a height, as would inevitably precipitate them into ruin. And this, I think, should have been obvious to all legislators, that whoever contrives to make a people very rich and great, lays the foundation of their misery and destruction, which in a short time will necessarily overtake them. For such vicissitudes of human affairs are as certain as those of heat and cold in the revolution of the year; and no condition of men, or public societies, is durable and lasting, except such as are established in mediocrity. Now in small governments laws may be duly executed, and the manners of men in a great measure preserved from corruption, but because such governments are not of force sufficient to defend themselves, a considerable number of them should be united together for the common safety; by which union and league they will be enabled to resist a powerful invasion, and yet remain uncapable of conquest. The three kingdoms of Scotland, England and Ireland, may serve for an example of this; which though situated on islands, are yet in their present condition exposed to the fate of a single battle, if a great army of enemies could be landed near London. But if good forts were erected in the most considerable passes; and twelve cities with all the sea ports well fortified, the loss of many battles would not determine the matter. And considering that our naval force might in a great measure intercept the supplies of the enemy, we might defend ourselves against all our neighbors. And as such a constitution would be altogether unfit to molest them, so it would give them little encouragement to disturb our peace.
At this rate, said Sir Christopher, if we should continue long in peace, and unaccustomed to war, we might become a prey to the first invader.
I answered that I did not think we ought to be wholly unconcerned in the affairs of the continent, but that such a constitution would certainly keep us from the danger of making conquests abroad, which in the present state of things any ambitious prince may attempt. Our militias might be usefully and honorably employed in assisting our neighbors to form the like leagues on the continent; and a gradual propagation of such excellent governments would become easy, when mankind should be convinced of the great happiness and security they would enjoy by living under them. And though these leagues might possibly at some time make wars upon one another on occasion of a sudden pique, or to take revenge for some un-neighborly action; yet such wars could not be lasting, because nothing but hopes of making acquisitions and conquests can make them so. And as to the advantage of having twelve cities governing themselves happily and virtuously, instead of one great vicious and ungovernable city, I leave it to your consideration, who have so judiciously shown, that great cities do not only corrupt the manners of their own inhabitants, but those of whole nations, and destroy all good government. Cities of moderate extent are easily governed, and the example and authority of one virtuous man is often sufficient to keep up good order and discipline; of which we have diverse instances in the history of the Grecian republic: whereas great multitudes of men are always deaf, to all remonstrances, and the frequency of ill example is more powerful than laws.
But, said Sir Christopher, to reduce London within the compass of the old walls seems a thing impracticable.
This difficulty will be removed, replied I, when this city shall be only the capital of the neighboring counties.
‘Twill be thought injustice, said he, to remove the seat of the government from a place which has been so long possessed of great advantage.
The injustice, said I, has been greater, that one place has so long enjoyed those profits which ought to have been divided among the considerable cities of the nation.
I am afraid, said he, that all endeavors to disturb the affairs of so great a body of people, only out of remote prospect of bettering their condition by a new regulation, may fall under the imputation of folly; and that men would think it hard to be plunged into such difficulties, as so great a change would necessarily occasion.
Sir, said I, if a French king, when he is in peace with other nations, should suddenly attack us with his whole power, how can we resist him in our present condition; having no fortified cities, and the great seat of our riches and power exposed to the very first insult of the invader. One would think such a people were predestinated to ruin. You talk of the folly and hardship of putting men into some difficulties by a new regulation of their affairs, and seem not to consider how much more cruel a thing it would be, to suffer those nations to be enslaved by a foreign invasion, or inevitably lose their liberty by that corruption of manners which this vicious and profligate city diffuses into every part.
I did not foresee, said Sir Christopher, what use you would make of my complaint against the depravation of manners that reigns in this town, but acknowledge the consequence you draw to be just; and that if we design to diminish the corruption, we must lessen the City.
What visions have we here, said Sir Edward? Destroy the greatest and most glorious city of the world to prosecute a whimsical project!
Sir, replied I, you have heard what I have answered to Sir Christopher, and besides, do you not think the remoter parts of England injured, by being obliged to have recourse to London for almost everything, and particularly for justice? Do you not think them wronged, in that almost all the treasure of England is yearly laid out in this place, and by that means the substance of the other parts exhausted, and their rents and revenues diminished?
This, said he, is of little importance to the Nation, so long as they continue to rise in the counties that lie nearest to the capital.
I do not know that, replied I; but am of opinion, that if instead of one, we had twelve cities in these kingdoms possessed of equal advantages, so many centers of men, riches and power, would be much more advantageous than one. For this vast city is like the head of a ricketty child, which by drawing to itself the nourishment that should be distributed in due proportions to the rest of the languishing body, becomes so overcharged that frenzy and death unavoidably ensue. And if the number of people and their riches would be far greater in twelve cities than now in one, which I think no man will dispute; and that these cities were such as are situated in convenient distances from each other, the relief and advantages they would bring to every part of these kingdoms would be unspeakable. For example, if the people of Yorkshire or Devenshire were not obliged to go farther than York or Exeter to obtain justice, and consequently had no occasion to spend money out of those counties, how soon should we see another face of things in both? How soon would they double and treble their present value? That London should draw the riches and governments of the three kingdoms to the southeast corner of this island, is in some degree as unnatural, as for one city to possess the riches and government of the world. And, as I said before, that men ought to be dispersed over all counties in greater or lesser numbers according to the fertility of the soil; so no doubt justice should be administered to all in the most convenient manner that may be, and no man be obliged to seek it at an inconvenient distance. And if the other parts of government are not also communicated to every considerable body of men; but that some of them must be forced to depend upon others, and be governed by those who reside far from them, and little value any interest except their own, studying rather how to weaken them in order to make sure of their subjection; I say, all such governments are violent, unjust and unnatural. I shall add, that so many different seats of government will highly encourage virtue. For all the same offices that belong to a great kingdom, must be in each of them; with this difference, that the offices of such a kingdom being always burdened with more business than any one man can rightly execute, most things are abandoned to the rapacity of servants; and, the extravagant profits of all great officers plunge them into all manner of luxury, and debauch them from doing good. Whereas the offices of these lesser governments extending only over a moderate number of people, will be duly executed, and many men have occasions put into their hands of doing good to their fellow citizens. So many different seats of government will highly tend to the improvement of all arts and sciences; and afford great variety of entertainment to all foreigners and others of a curious and inquisitive genius, as the ancient cities of Greece did.
I perceive now, said Sir Edward, the tendency of all this discourse. On my conscience he has contrived the whole scheme to no other end than to set his own country on an equal foot with England and the rest of the world.
To tell you the truth, said I, the insuperable difficulty I found of making my country happy by any other way, led me insensibly to the discovery of these things; which, if I mistake not, have no other tendency than to render, not only my own country, but all mankind as happy as the imperfections of human nature will admit. For I considered that in a state of separation from England, my country would be perpetually involved in bloody and destructive wars. And if
we should be united to that kingdom in any other manner, we must of necessity fall under the miserable and languishing conditions of all places that depend upon a remote seat of government. And pray where lies the prejudice, if the three kingdoms were united on so equal a foot, as for every to take away all suspicion and jealousy of separation? That virtue and industry might be universally encouraged, and every part contribute cheerfully and in due proportion to the security and defense of this union, which will preserve us so effectually from those two great calamites, war and corruption of manners. This is the only just and rational kind of union. All other coalitions are but the unjust subjection of one people to another.
Here I stopped; but after some pause finding the rest of the company silent, I continued to say, that I would not pretend to determine whether each of the portions, into which I had divided Europe, should be confined to the precise number of twelve cities; though possibly if they were more, they might be subject to some confusion; and if not so many, would not answer the end. That I would not determine whether they should altogether consist of cities that are already considerable, as in these islands are London, Bristol, Exeter, Chester, Norwich, York, Stirling, Inverness, Dublin, Cork, Galloway, Londonderry; or whether some other places more conveniently situated for strength, and more capable of fortification, might not rather be of the number. But his early division of territory I think indispensably necessary, that to every city all the next adjacent country should belong.”