The Technics of Decentralization
Menace of the Juggernauts
An argument frequently used to disprove the feasibility of decentralizing and simplifying our economic structure, runs somewhat in this fashion:
Aside from any opinions as to the desirability or undesirability of the process, it is a fact that certain of the largest and most advanced nations have succumbed to the philosophy of extreme centralization. Germany, Italy and Japan, classifying themselves as “have-not” countries, are leading the march toward the totalitarian form of government, and toward the extremes of regimented economy. These nations, rightly or wrongly, are deliberately and strenuously organizing their people, their resources, and their industries for the purpose of expansion and conquest. Their admitted ideal is the “nation in arms,” the gigantic war-machine, capable of mobilizing its forces on the shortest possible notice and of dealing a blow of such crushing power that no enemy can resist it.
Guns Instead of Butter
To implement these war-machines the heavy mass-production industries in these countries are being developed feverishly; steel, engines and motors, machine-tools, chemicals — necessary ingredients of shells, guns, tanks, aircrafts, explosives—are being produced in the enormous quantities which are possible only with highly centralized, highly industrialized economic regimes. Regardless of the effect of this guns-instead-of-butter policy on the lives of the inhabitants of these nations, there is no doubt that it is creating in the world a group of immensely powerful military machines—machines which menace the peace and security of the entire family of nations. In the face of such an international situation, how can any country which hopes to survive, permit its citizens to be influenced by a policy of decentralization, of evolution toward a simplified agrarian economy? Even granting that such an economy is humanly desirable, it must inevitably reduce any country which practices it into a defenseless condition, minus the means of fabricating and mobilizing the heavy armaments it must have merely for self-protection. Even such a great and richly endowed land as the United States, if it by some flight of fancy were to transform itself into the ideal decentralist state, would be in a dangerous situation. With the fanatical imperialism of Japan rampant on her Pacific coast, with jealous, dictatorial Mexico to the south, with Germany and Italy deluging Latin America in fascist propaganda, a decentralized America would soon be dismembered by the nations motivated by a doctrine of aggressive, concentrated power.
Powering the Juggernauts
At first glance this argument carries considerable weight.
It is true that a decentralized economic state would have great difficulty in building up such a super-powered car of Juggernaut as the modern totalitarian states are creating. Its heavy, mass-production industries would be insufficient to equip such a titanic war machine; its transport system would not be geared to concentrate and carry afield the enormous supply of food, fuel, munitions, and machinery necessary to keep it functioning.
It is no coincidence that this should be so. As many observers have pointed out, the economic machinery of the first industrial, revolution is machinery geared primarily for conquest and exploitation. The power-mass-production technique was first developed and employed for equipping European armies of the Renaissance: and the spirit of conquest, whether by actual military force or by economic domination, has marked its development. It implies always a reaching out into new fields, and this urge in turn demands high development of the means of transport—ships, railroads, automobiles, and now airplanes. The economic and industrial structure created by this philosophy is ideally suited for the maintenance of the highly mechanized, mobile, heavily-powered offensive monolithic state.
Japan, which is such a state in the throes of an aggressive campaign of expansion and economic conquest, illustrates perfectly the economic and technological measures which are necessary to make possible such a campaign. To satisfy the needs of her vast expeditionary force, her centralized mass-production industries are geared to the very highest level of production, at the expense of everything else. Her finances and her export industries (primarily cotton weaving) are deliberately manipulated for but one purpose: to provide foreign credit for the importation of steel, oil, and machine-tools, with which to implement and power her war-machine. Deliberately she plans to incorporate conquered areas of Manchuria and North China into her centralized economic network. Diversified farming amongst the peasants of the later region is to be discouraged in favor of cotton monoculture which will make the region contributory to and dependent on the planned economy of the empire.
Along with this policy the people of Japan experience all the worst effects of a war economy: declining standard of living, lengthening hours of factory work with diminishing wage scale, complete regimentation by “the authorities”—the army, the police, the barons of industry and finance, similar developments (although perhaps not carried to such extremes) are to be seen in all the totalitarian states girding themselves for expansion or supposedly heroic death on the battlefield.
Modern “Absolute War”
The philosophy behind all this activity is expressed in the simple de law: Kill or be killed. The idea that a nation can no longer exist quietly within its own borders, indulging in a healthy amount of foreign trade, adjusting its population growth and its economic methods by scientific means to its resources. Instead it is hounded by a snarling pack of wolf-states, ready to pounce on it and swallow it up unless it succeeds in pouncing first. Hence guns-instead-of-butter, the nation-in-arms, the “absolute war” of Ludendorff, Douhet, and the modern European strategists. Build up, with all the aid of modern mass-production technology, an army of terrific long-distance hitting power. Hurl a spearhead of tanks and mobile mechanized troops deep into the enemy’s vitals. Puncture his nerve centers—his railheads, his factories, his powerhouses—with devastating bombardment by fast-flying planes. Gas and thermite-bomb his cities, strafe his highways. Reduce his economic structure to a jelly, terrorize his citizens. Conquer him, completely and utterly—for otherwise he would conquer you. And after that, absorb him. “Educate” his children. Take over his industries and interlock them with your own, so that even greater concentration of power may be secured and new preparations begun for the conquest of enemies still farther afield.
This is the theory of modern absolute war. It is warfare expressly designed for the subjugation of today’s centralized, highly industrialized countries. This strategy admits that, so long as such countries retain reasonably intact their internal structure, they can continue to equip and supply formidable mechanized armies which will reduce warfare on recognized military fronts to a stalemate of the World War variety. Therefore, destroy the internal structure of the enemy nation. Says Liddell-Hart, one of the keenest modern military observers:
“With the growth of social and industrial organization, economic targets have proportionately outgrown military targets, and they have become more sensitive as the latter have become less vulnerable. The complex web of a nation’s industry, its administration and supply, can be easily torn. . . .Aircraft (and other modern weapons) enable us to jump over the army which shields the enemy government, industry and people, and so strike directly and immediately at the seat of the opposing will and policy. A nation’s nerve-system, no longer covered by the flesh of its troops, is now laid bare to attack, and like the human nerves, the progress of civilization has rendered it far more sensitive than in earlier and more primitive times.”
Enforced Decentralization
Now the curious thing is, that although a modern decentralized state would be manifestly incapable of waging aggressive war of this streamlined sort, it would be ideally adapted for defense against it. As to this fact Liddell-Hart again has some pertinent remarks:
“Military wisdom now lies, not in amassing armies, but in diminishing national vulnerability. This is a compound of factors. The very industry that augments a nation’s strength for military action may produce a counterbalancing degree of vulnerability. And the centralization of industry may counteract the growth of industry from a military point of view. Every means of reducing and dispersing targets, and also of decreasing their sensitiveness, should be sought. . . .A sturdy individualism based on a regime of reason and freedom, so long as it does not relapse into inertia, may withstand the shocks better than the emotionalism bred by totalitarianism, with its insistence on mass-psychology and incessant appeal to mass-sentiment. The self-reliant individual, capable of thinking for himself, has a better chance of adaptation to the unexpected. And the one certainty about modern war is that it is more uncertain than it ever was.”
It is curious to see these specifications for a social pattern, implicit in the ideals of decentralists, thus brought forward on totally different grounds: the grounds of effective defense against totalitarian war.
Yet it is a fact that this pattern which Jefferson advocated as the best defense against tyranny and economic and political ills, when brought up to date technologically is also the best defense against invasion. The plans of the war offices of today’s militaristic nations call for a whirlwind attack by air and mechanized cavalry in the enemy’s vital spots—his steel and machine-manufacturing sectors, his food storage and distribution arteries. But what if, as in a decentralized country, there are no such concentrations of vital functions? What if food is produced in equal abundance throughout the entire countryside, what if industries and technical establishments are scattered in regionally adequate units? There are then no targets for the invincible massed airplane and tank fleets and the heavy artillery.
To conquer such a country the invader must himself decentralize, must break his forces down into light-armed units capable of dealing with a myriad small objectives.
But immediately he is faced with the task of waging a kind of super-guerilla warfare on a broad front over hostile territory, against intelligent and technically-advanced defenders. The heavy war-machines which his mass-production industries are geared to supply are at a serious disadvantage in such warfare, and it becomes impossible for him to strike the decisive blow on which his plans are based.
That this is not simply theory is well illustrated in the two present military proving-grounds. The failure of the highly mechanized Japanese expeditionary force to achieve final and crushing victories in China is a matter of international wonder. And China, a nation fighting a defensive war if there ever was one, is resorting more and more to decentralist ideas in her internal economy—in strong contrast to the frenzied centralization of the Japanese aggressor. A strong cooperative movement is now on foot in China, working toward the establishment of small local industries to supply her needs.
In Spain as well, defense tactics and technics based on similar ideas are proving remarkably effective against the technological juggernauts. Simple one-man weapons, such as the anti-tank rifle, the tank grenade, even burning gasoline and concealed pits, have almost checkmated the supposedly irresistible land battleship. Bombing squadrons have not been able to subdue countrysides as they were so confidently expected to do.
Little Switzerland, for generations a model of a sane and well-managed democratic country, has profited by such lessons and adopted a decentralized defense plan which is effective enough to give pause to the heavily armed aggressors along her borders. Small pillbox fortifications dotting her frontiers, manned by local minute-man militia, promise such stiff resistance to invading mechanized armies that even High Commands think twice before laying plans for turning the stubborn little republic into a military highway. For her to attempt to put into practice the doctrine that “the best defense is a strong offense” would be suicidal, but by adopting this commonsense defense policy she is safeguarding her position as effectively as possible, even though she remains a pygmy amongst belligerent giants.
Incidentally, decentralized industries, small factories situated in the midst of garden communities, have long been the rule in Switzerland and this balanced economy together with her form of government which safeguards against overconcentration of power, has been given much credit for the little nation’s remarkable stability and staying power.
Even on the high seas that apotheosis of big-industry warfare, the dreadnaught, is being severely tried. As a long-range offensive weapon, for guarding imperial lines of communication and maintaining mastery of the seas, it is still no doubt supreme. But the new mosquito fleets of torpedo-carrying speedboats, now being developed by all navies, aided by defensive bombing squadrons and small submarines, make the vicinity of any coastline defended by such means extremely, unhealthy for big battleships.
It seems certain, therefore, that insofar as honest defense measures are concerned, military technics is definitely evolving in a way that fits in with the picture of the coming decentralized state.
Admittedly the defense plan for such a state would still have to be administered by a strong central war department, but not even the most ardent decentralist would deny that there are certain functions for which an effective central government is indispensable. The interesting thing is that the kind of technology and economic structure which can best resist the threat of absolute war is the very opposite of the concentrated, interlocking mass-production social order of the super-states.