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War Strategy: Decentralization of Command to Succeed in Battle

DECENTRALISM FILE

Gen. Alfred M. Gray Jr., Warfighting (US Marine Corps, FMFM1, 1989)

Gen. Gray (1928- ) enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1950 and was made a 2nd Lt. in 1952. He served in Korea and Vietnam, and then as General and 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1987 to 1991. He is credited with emphasizing maneuver warfare in desert and cold weather environments.

An excerpt from the U.S. Marine Corps Manual on the principles and philosophy of warfighting may seem an unusual item for an anthology on decentralization. Upon reflection, however, a profound truth emerges from the Manual’s Philosophy of Command: that for this great fighting force to succeed in battle, command must be decentralized. The overall commander may have the greatest strategic grasp of the situation, and the longest time frame, but necessarily he cannot know the exact situation facing a platoon leader or company commander on the field of battle. Those lower level commanders must be made clear about the commander’s intent, and understand his orders. But beyond this, the lower level leaders must make use of their training and experience to act in the heat of battle without specific orders from the center.

To this philosophy, not invented by but crisply and clearly stated by Commandant Gray, the Marines owe much of their battlefield success. In the now-classic struggle for Guadalcanal, in the South Pacific in 1942, well-trained Marine battalion and company commanders who were cut off from division control acted effectively to achieve the mission of the Corps, but Japanese units in similar situations either milled about aimlessly in the jungle or sacrificed themselves in meaningless and ineffective banzai charges against Marine positions.

The Marine philosophy of command is designed for military combat, but its principles, like those of Sun Tzu’s classic The Art of War, apply to many other kinds of contests. They echo the works of economists such as Von Mises and Hayek, who demonstrated that no economy can be effectively managed from the center, and of social thinkers like Tocqueville and Buber, who portrayed the absurdities that flow from centralized rule.

For an amplification of Gen. Gray’s argument through history, see MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge University Press, 2001).”The most successful lasting innovations have been the ones that stress decentralization of command and control in war.

The Marine Corps’ style of warfare requires intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to the lowest levels. Boldness is an essential moral trait in a leader, for it generates combat power beyond the physical means at hand. Initiative, the willingness to act on one’s own judgment, is a prerequisite for boldness. These traits curried to excess can lead to rashness, but we must realize that errors by junior leaders stemming from overboldness are a necessary part of learning. We should deal with such errors leniently; there must be no “zero defects” mentality. Not only must we not stifle boldness or initiative, we must continue to encourage both traits in spite of mistakes. On the other hand, we should deal severely with errors of inaction or timidity. We will not accept lack of orders as justification for inaction; it is each Marine’s duty to take initiative as the situation demands.

Consequently, trust is an essential trait among leaders — trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors. Trust must be earned, and actions which undermine trust must meet with strict censure. Trust is a product of confidence and familiarity. Confidence among comrades results from demonstrated professional skill. Familiarity results from shared experience and a common professional philosophy.

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Basic individual skills are an essential foundation for combat effectiveness and must receive heavy emphasis. All Marines, regardless of occupational specialty, will be trained in basic combat skills. At the same time, unit skills are extremely important. They are not simply an accumulation of individual skills; adequacy in individual skills does not automatically mean unit skills are satisfactory.

Commanders at each echelon must allot subordinates sufficient time and freedom to conduct the training necessary to achieve proficiency at their levels. They must ensure that higher-level demands do not deny subordinates adequate opportunities for autonomous training and that oversupervision does not prevent subordinate commanders from training their units as they believe appropriate.

In order to develop initiative among junior leaders, the conduct of training—like combat—should be decentralized. Senior commanders influence training by establishing goals and standards, communicating the intent of training, and establishing a focus of effort for training. As a rule, they should refrain from dictating how the training will be accomplished.

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Philosophy of command

It is essential that our philosophy of command support the way we fight. First and foremost, in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command must be decentralized. That is, subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior’s intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed down. Further, a competent subordinate commander who is at the point of decision will naturally have a better appreciation for the true situation than a senior some distance removed. Individual initiative and responsibility are of paramount importance. The principal means by which we implement decentralized control is through the use of mission tactics, which we will discuss in detail later.

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A commander should command from well forward. This allows him to see and sense firsthand the ebb and flow of combat, to gain an intuitive appreciation for the situation which he cannot obtain from reports. It allows him to exert his personal influence at decisive points during the action. It also allows him to locate himself closer to the events that will influence the situation so that he can observe them directly and circumvent the delays and inaccuracies that result from passing information up the chain of command.

Finally, we recognize the importance of personal leadership. Only by his physical presence—by demonstrating the willingness to share danger and privation—can the commaAll Peoplender fully gain the trust and confidence of his subordinates.

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Next, our philosophy requires competent leadership at all levels. A centralized system theoretically needs only one competent person, the senior commander, since his is the sole authority. But a decentralized system requires leaders at all levels to demonstrate sound and timely judgment. As a result, initiative becomes an essential condition of competence among commanders.

 

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